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Abstract 
Hungary is one of the worst-hit countries of the current financial crisis in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The deteriorating economic performance of the country is, however, not a recent 
phenomenon. A relatively high ratio of redistribution, a high and persistent public deficit and 
accelerated indebtedness characterised the country not just in the last couple of years but also 
well before the transformation, which also continued in the postsocialist years. The gradualist 
success of the country – which dates back to at least 1968 – in the field of liberalisation, 
marketisation and privatisation was accompanied by a constant overspending in the general 
government. The paper attempts to explore the reasons behind policymakers’ impotence to 
reform public finances. By providing a path-dependent explanation, it argues that both 
communist and postcommunist governments used the general budget as a buffer to 
compensate losers of economic reforms, especially microeconomic restructuring. The ever-
widening circle of net benefiters of welfare provisions paid from the general budget, however, 
has made it simply unrealistic to implement sizeable fiscal adjustment, putting the country 
onto a deteriorating path of economic development. 
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1. Introduction 
Hungary has been long admired for its mild and politically calm transformation process and 
its apparently well-designed reform strategy, the predecessors of which dated back to the New 
Economic Mechanism (NEM) of 1968. The evident successes in the field of marketisation, 
liberalisation and microeconomic restructuring, however, masked the inaction in other fields, 
such as public finances. Apart from a few exceptional episodes, the general government has 
been left mostly untouched; thus, persistent delay and helplessness characterised the last 
couple of decades in this respect. Understanding such a controversial performance is, 
however, not an easy task. This paper attempts to explore the reasons behind policymakers’ 
impotence to reform public finances. By providing a path-dependent explanation, the paper 
argues that both communist and postcommunist governments used the general budget as a 
buffer to compensate losers of economic and political reforms. The ever-widening circle of 
net benefiters of welfare provisions paid from the general budget made it simply unrealistic to 
implement sizeable fiscal adjustment, putting the country onto a deteriorating path of 
economic development. 
The general budget has become the means for compensating people for losses, 
especially in the early times of microeconomic restructuring, which added strongly to 
transformational recession. While in other transition countries the euphoria at the time of the 
systemic change provided a so-called “window of opportunity” for politicians to implement 
severe reforms, no such opportunity emerged in Hungary. The long reform tradition of the 
country on the one hand and the peaceful and politically calm political change in the 
framework of a close collaboration between the old and the new elites on the other hand made 
the change evident for the people, who did not feel it necessary to pay for the costs of the 
change accordingly. The heavy burden of structural reform in the sphere of the micro 
economy was compensated by increased public provisions in the form of household transfer 
or public sector employment, thereby prolonging paternalism. Albeit a near-to-crisis situation 
triggered a fiscal stabilisation in Hungary by 1995, soon after the recovery, politicians 
returned to fiscal indiscipline, fuelling private consumption from public sources with the 
slogan of compensating people for sufferings during the austerity measures of 1995-1997.  
The hypothesis of the paper is accordingly that the success of marketisation and 
microeconomic restructuring, a process that started well before the systemic change itself, 
came at the price of a deteriorated performance of public finances and a lack of fiscal 
discipline in general. In more technical terms: hardening the budget constraint of firms came 
at the cost of maintaining the soft budget constraint of the state.  
Following the short introduction, Section 2 provides a stylised fact analysis of the 
deteriorated Hungarian public finances. Section 3 turns to the explanation of the puzzle of 
persistent deficit and elaborates on the reform experience of Hungary between 1968 and 1989, 
showing that market reform and fiscal profligacy emerged at the same time in the country. 
Section 4 concentrates on the transformation years and its aftermath to date, claiming that the 
path-dependent character of Hungarian development prevents the country from returning to 
the track of sustainable fiscal policy. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Fiscal laxity: stylised facts 
After twenty years of the systemic change and five years as European Union members, 
Hungary has successfully developed into a full-fledged market economy. The country has 
been one of the most successful in the process of marketisation, liberalisation and 
microeconomic restructuring. However, the performance in the field of public finances is far 
from convincing. Fiscal profligacy has become an imminent feature of the country and the 
reform of the general government has suffered serious delays.  
 Hungary, a country with 60 per cent of the average income of the EU (on PPP), maintains a 
relatively high level of redistribution. The ratio of public spending to GDP has always been at 
(or beyond) 50 per cent, a ratio that is characteristic of the welfare states of Nordic countries 
or France – countries with at least twice as high levels of development in terms of GDP (on 
PPP) than Hungary. More importantly, none of the former socialist countries – with an almost 
same level of development – has such a sizeable state (varying from 30 to 45 per cent in 
GDP). Admittedly, there are substantial differences with regard to the size of states across 
Europe and the industrialised world.
3
 Yet, the relatively large redistribution can make a 
country more vulnerable to external shocks. (Comparative data on EU countries are displayed 
in Figure 1.) 
In Hungary, however, the high redistribution ratio has existed together with an 
extremely high and persistent budget deficit for the last two decades. Hungary managed to 
reduce its deficit below the Maastricht reference value only once; fiscal balance showed a 6 
per cent deficit on average during this period. The general government deficit has been mainly 
due to the overruns in the primary balance, especially in current spending. Public debt has 
also accumulated without bounds and reached the highest level among new member states, 
totalling at 73 per cent of the GDP by 2008 – the CEE10 average was 26.8 per cent in the 
same year (EC 2009). A high and persistent deficit, together with an accelerated debt-ratio, 
can seriously devaluate the growth potential of any country and endangers economic stability. 
 
Figure 1. Public expenditures and revenues (general government) in EU27 
 
Source: own construction, data are taken from HNB (2008) 
Note: data as of 2006. The arrow (and the red dot) indicates the preferred position of 
Hungary by 2011. 
 
The real challenge to the country’s fiscal sustainability is the unhealthy structure of the 
general government, especially on the expenditure side. Both the compensation of public 
sector employees and household transfers significantly exceed that of neighbouring countries 
and also most of the EU15 countries. Over-employment has become a serious problem in the 
                                                 
3
 Redistribution rates are of course not exogenous in the sense that they are strongly influenced by several 
political, historical and cultural patterns (see Aghion et al. 2004 for instance). Furthermore, there is no consensus 
at all in the literature on the optimal size of states. Both low and high redistribution ratios can deliver robust 
economic performance (see Sweden and Finland on the one hand and Ireland on the other hand). 
Hungarian public sector: one-fourth of total employees work in the public sector, illustrating 
the inefficient functioning of the state administration. Structure of welfare spending suffers 
serious distortions, too. On the one side, spending on health care and education is slightly 
below that of the EU15’s average, whereas household transfers – such as family and child 
allowances, sick pay, disability pay or early retirement payments – are more generous than in 
most of the old member states. The disincentive structure of welfare provisions makes non-
participation in the labour market appealing. The labour force participation ratio – 56 per cent 
– is the lowest among OECD countries. Somewhat strangely, economic functions conducted 
by the state often serve the interest of households, therefore price regulations on gas, housing 
or pharmaceuticals should be considered as welfare payments, too.
4
 Table 1 depicts the 
distorted structure of the Hungarian general budget in a comparative perspective.  
 
Table 1. General government spending by economic decomposition, 2005 
 EU15 CEE8 Hungary 
Compensation of public sector 
employees 
10.9 10.0 12.6 
Collective consumption 
expenditure 
8.1 8.9 9.9 
Social transfers in kind 12.8 10.1 12.6 
Social benefits other than 
social transfers in kind 
16.0 11.8 14.5 
Subsidies 1.1 1.3 1.1 
Interest payments 2.7 1.6 3.9 
Other current expenditures 2.2 2.2 2.5 
Gross fixed capital formation 2.4 3.4 4.0 
Source: EC (2006) 
Note: data as per cent of the GDP 
 
The general tendency to overruns in the fiscal balance and the unsustainable structure 
of the general government are, however, not new phenomena at all. They have been deeply 
rooted in the past development of the country. Advanced reforms in the field of micro 
economy and successive failures in the field of public finances are the two sides of the same 
coin; they are strongly related to each other. Practically, the road of liberalisation, stabilisation 
and privatisation was paved by compromises and compensations buffered by the general 
budget. 
 
 
3. Reform socialism (1968-1989): marketisation along with paternalism  
The classical Stalinist regime prevailed for a relatively short period of time in Hungary. In the 
Stalinist regime, the maintenance of the political power of the Party, along with Marxist-
Leninist ideology, was underpinned by an almost complete nationalisation of property rights. 
State ownership and bureaucratic coordination – together with the massive use of political 
repression and terror – provided a solid ground for forced industrialisation. A rapid and 
extensive growth of the heavy industries was compelled at the cost of the light industry and 
agriculture. The constant state of alertness for war and the extensive use of natural resources 
caused serious and constant shortages of consumer goods.
5
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 Benedek et al. (2006) estimated the welfare part of economic functions of the state to 2 per cent of GDP.  
5
 On the classical socialist regime, see especially Kornai (1992) and Kozminski (2008). 
By the mid-sixties, however, Hungary chose a different track. Instead of a blatantly 
repressive system, the communist party elite opted for the creation of an environment which 
endorsed political calm and material well-being. The historical lessons drawn from the 
Revolution of 1956 forced political leaders to recognise the importance of meeting the 
material satisfaction of the people (Kornai 1990 and 1997). Public spending was thereby 
redirected from physical investment to the material welfare of the citizens, a shift that elicited 
the expression “goulash communism” as a namesake for the Hungarian system.  
From 1968 onwards, reforms with varying intensities were high on the agenda of 
Hungarian policy-makers. In rhetoric, the main objective of the first cycle of reforms (1968-
1973) was to increase the efficiency of the economy by introducing market incentives on the 
level of firms. Decentralisation swept mandatory output targets and input quotas away; 
economic decisions were delegated onto the level of factories, thereby giving more 
discretionary power to the managers. Indirect financial instruments were introduced in order 
to influence the behaviour of enterprises. Reform attempts culminated in an accelerated 
growth performance, which fuelled the improvement of individuals’ living standards.6 
Whatever merits the New Economic Mechanism had, the ultimate goal of the Party 
elite was not economic efficiency per se. The decision to move towards marketisation was 
determined solely by political considerations. Party leaders of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party engaged in stabilising their political power by providing additional economic 
growth and prosperity for families. Learning from past mistakes, a kind of “consumption-
oriented” approach to socialism evolved, where the emphasis was put on people’s own 
relative prosperity, instead of forced savings and industrialisation. The NEM can be best 
interpreted therefore as a tacit agreement between the citizens and the Party: in exchange for 
the relatively high standard of living and the relative freedom (hence the term “the happiest 
barrack”), citizens had to remain loyal to Party leaders and did not question the raison d’etre 
of the socialist regime itself.
 7
 
The success was, however, relatively short-lived. On the one hand, external shock in 
the form of the first oil crisis caused severe structural tensions in the country. Internal factors, 
however, played a possibly even more important role in the failure of the New Economic 
Mechanism. The “genetic programme” of the communist regime made it basically impossible 
for market reforms to achieve a new and stable equilibrium (Kornai 1992). Bureaucratic 
intervention did not decline in practice; it was replaced by indirect bureaucratic management. 
The change occurred in form only, and left the intensity of economic dependence untouched.
8
  
In spite of economic slowdown, political interest was strong in preserving the relative 
well-being of citizens; the objective of consumption-maximisation did not change 
accordingly. The base for such a regime was not increased productivity anymore but foreign 
resources. The accumulation of foreign debt and the structural crisis of the world economy 
made it unavoidable for Hungary to start on its second reform cycle by 1982.
9
 The most 
significant elements of the reform steps were the following: informal activities (often called 
second economies) were legalised; small private firms (mostly in the service sector) were 
officially recognised; corporations could enter the financial market by issuing bonds; a two-
tier banking system and a new, market-conform tax system were introduced, etc.  
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 Hare (1983) claimed accordingly that the NEM made Hungary unequivocally different from the rest of the 
Eastern bloc countries. 
7
 Importantly, in stark contrast to the Czech attempts of 1968, the Hungarian leaders never refuted the leading 
role of the Soviet Union.  
8
 Originally, it was assumed that quasi market incentives should have induced competitiveness among firms. In 
practice, however, enterprises started to bargain with the different levels of bureaucracy for additional resources, 
a phenomenon that was called as “plan bargaining” (Kornai 1992). Economic agents did not negotiate over the 
targets anymore, instead over a complex net of economic regulations (such as credit, price, tax and subsidy).  
9
 See especially Bauer (1988). 
The official aim was to restore the competitiveness of the Hungarian economy, but the 
real aim was to give room for individuals to earn a decent income in order to maintain the 
relative well-being of families or at least to avoid a further deterioration. The sixties saw the 
change of the incentive structure of large state enterprises and cooperatives, in order to induce 
competition amongst them. The eighties, however, gave a chance for private and semiprivate 
sectors to spring into existence.
10
  
As market reforms from the early eighties onwards have been adopted by necessity 
since the driving force for market reform was to avoid further deterioration in economic 
activity and individuals’ wealth status, the state also embarked on generous welfare 
programmes. The relative share of income from work declined substantially, as opposed to 
other non-work related sources (see Table 2). Since marketisation unavoidably increased 
uncertainty, the state compensated the losers of the reforms by more generous welfare 
spending, which was directly built into the state budget (thereby becoming untouchable social 
rights).
11
 Marketisation and economic restructuring were therefore implemented by applying 
measures which strengthened the winning coalition and minimised the number of losers at the 
same time. With market incentives and private property on the one hand and increased 
welfare spending on the other hand, pragmatist Party-leaders provided a credible commitment 
to both market reform (favouring winners) and compensation schemes (placating losers).
12
 
 
Table 2. Disaggregating personal income  
 Income 
from work 
Social 
benefits in 
cash 
Social 
benefits in 
kind 
Income 
from other 
sources 
1960 80.4 7.0 11.4 1.2 
1970 76.1 11.3 11.3 1.3 
1975 71.5 15.5 11.7 1.3 
1980 68.0 18.9 13.1 0.1 
1985 65.6 19.9 14.1 0.4 
1990 58.1 22.6 16.6 2.7 
Source: Kornai (1997) 
 
 
4. After the change 
4.1. Big bang versus gradualism 
The first free election in May 1990 found Hungary with an almost complete price 
liberalisation (Csaba 1995). The foundations for structural reforms were also laid down a year 
before the elections by adopting the Company Act and the Transformation Act. In turn, 
spontaneous privatisation evolved. Accordingly, there was no need to apply a big bang 
approach in Hungary which was chosen by several other CEE countries, especially Poland 
and Russia. Big-bangers wanted to prevent their countries from reversal (both in political and 
economic terms) and argued that with speedy reforms the elite of the old regime could be 
demolished.
13
 In Hungary, with its long reform tradition, however, political change managed 
to evolve without mass demonstrations and strikes in a politically calm and peaceful 
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 By the mid-80s more than 10,000 small new enterprises (“petty cooperatives” or “independent contract work 
associations”) existed, in contrast to less than 1000 state and cooperative enterprises. 
11
 On individual-specific uncertainty, from a purely theoretical point of view, see Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). 
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 These are basically the methods of a (successful) gradualist approach (Roland 2002). 
13
 On the big-bang versus gradualism debate, see Balczerowitz (1995) and Gros and Steinherr (1995) on the one 
hand and Aghion and Blanchard (1994), Dewatripont and Roland (1995) or Roland and Verdier (1999) on the 
other hand. 
environment. The so-called “round-table” negotiations defined the framework and the 
sequence of the political shift to democracy with the consent of the communists.
14
  
The reform tradition and the relative successes did not prevent Hungary from 
implementing a series of painful reforms with the explicit aim of hardening the budget 
constraint of firms and individuals in 1990 and 1991. The Hungarian bankruptcy law 
liquidated insolvent capacities mercilessly, causing an immediate and drastic fall in economic 
activity.
15
 Hardening the budget constraint of enterprises came at a high price, however. 
Transformation recession totalled at 18 per cent of the GDP by 1993, and Hungary 
experienced the most dramatic fall in employment in turn in the region. From its 1989 level, 
employment declined first to 87 per cent by 1991 and then further down to 72 by 1994. The 
numbers for the same period were 90 and 85.5 in Poland and 93.5 and 90.5 in the Czech 
Republic. Unemployment reached double-digit numbers in the first half of the nineties; it 
peaked at 12 in Hungary.
16
 (Basu et al. 2000) 
Under socialism, guaranteed employment meant a solid safety net for families. The 
appearance of the second economy also provided some extra income for citizens. After the 
change, the loss of jobs in both the first and the second economy in turn endangered the living 
standard of individuals and also the relative political calm. In principle, the transformation 
recession should have triggered dramatic erosion in living standards and private consumption, 
which was not the case, however. Private consumption declined proportionally much less than 
other macroeconomic variables – see Table 3.  
 
Table 3. GDP and its components, 1989-1994 
 GDP Final  consumption Gross capital  formation 
  Total of which: total 
household 
consumption 
Total of which: fixed 
capital 
formation 
1989 100 100 100 100 100 
1990 96.5 97.3 96.4 95.5 93 
1991 84.8 92.3 90.8 75.3 83.3 
1992 82.3 92.7 90.8 60.1 81.2 
1993 81.7 97.7 92.4 79.5 82.7 
1994 84.2 95.4 92.4 95.1 93 
Source: own calculations based on CSO (2007). 
Note: The closing date is 1994, because one year later Hungary adopted an austerity 
package.  
 
The taxi and lorry drivers’ blockade against the price increase of petrol just after 4 
months of the free elections made it overt for incumbents that Hungarians did not tolerate the 
decline in their wealth status. It was clear that reform in the micro sphere could go further 
only if the government compensated citizens. To put it differently: the new democratic leaders 
recognised that the price for microeconomic restructuring was accordingly the preservation of 
the relative well-being of citizens – a phenomenon that was nothing new indeed in Hungary. 
Economic development in Hungary, therefore, showed a strong path-dependent character, 
which narrowed down the array of policy options substantially. Household transfers were 
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 In fact, members of the previous system were allowed to participate in the first free elections and became 
members of the new establishment. 
15
 The liquidation of low-quality companies triggered the need for large bank consolidations, too (Király 1994). 
16
 Unemployment rate was even higher in Poland; it peaked at 16 per cent. Unemployment in the Czech Republic 
reached only a very low level of 3.5 per cent in the early years of transformation. Nevertheless, following the 
1997 Czech crisis, it climbed to 8 per cent. 
expanded to an extent which could significantly counterbalance the negative consequences of 
output fall. The general budget was burdened by generous social entitlements in the form of 
unemployment benefits, family allowances, sick leaves, early retirement schemes, etc., 
preserving thereby the pre-born welfare state of the socialist past.
17
 
The expansion of social entitlements paid by the government was, however, not a 
well-grounded decision of the political elite. Instead, it was a reaction to the negative 
economic tendencies, the fear of otherwise a definite denial of reforms. As the communists 
purchased the loyalty of citizens by providing an unsustainably high standard of living by 
maximising current consumption at the expense of the future, the government at the time of 
transformation followed a similar attitude. By providing a relatively generous social 
protection, individual-specific uncertainty could be reduced substantially in times of a severe 
economic fall. Individuals in turn considered increased welfare payments as rightful 
compensations for the loss of their jobs, making it rather hard to cut back on them later on. 
Paradoxically, there was a strong tendency for a high level of redistribution and overspending 
at a time when one of the major challenges of the country was to deconstruct the old and 
inefficient state structure and to promote a shift towards getting incentives right that are 
compatible with market economies.  
In fact, the gradualist character of the economic transformation was not the result of a 
conscious decision of the first freely elected government, but a historically determined 
outcome of a two-decade long reform process, which culminated in the political change of 
1989. Applying the term “gradualist” with regard to Hungary is therefore misleading. 
Originally, the theorists of gradual reforms favoured a sequenced and embedded reform 
process and argued against the total suspension of past capacities, since it would have 
triggered an unnecessary fall in supply, ending up in impoverishing and frustrating citizens. 
The early years of the Hungarian transformation, however, according to Csaba (1995), were 
burdened with ambiguity in policy decisions and a lack of coherence.  
 
 
4.2 Stabilisation and a return to paternalism  
The artificially high level of aggregate demand caused serious imbalances in both the internal 
and external positions of Hungary. With the re-emergence of a twin-deficit, a financial crisis 
threatened in 1994-95. The inaction of the Hungarian authorities on the one hand and the 
Mexican financial crisis of 1994-95 on the other hand made international financial investors 
reluctant to finance Hungary. In order to avert a crisis, a stabilisation package was adopted by 
1995. The fundamental goal of the surprise package was to remedy the disequilibria in both 
the foreign and the internal balances, thereby stopping the dangerous spiral of indebtedness, 
and consequently regaining the trust of foreign investors. While preserving the political calm 
was an eminent objective of both socialist and postsocialist governments between 1968 and 
1995, the austerity package reneged on it and made the restoration of economic stability the 
only valid goal.
18
 
The package aimed at enforcing short-term stabilisation and long-term sustainability at 
the same time. Besides the strict measures of demand contraction, it also tried to break down 
the pre-born paternalist welfare state. While in adjustment it was successful, its more 
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 While the economically active population declined from 5.22 million in 1989 to 4.54 million by 1994, the total 
number of pensioners and other beneficiaries increased from 2.42 million to 2.95 million. The monthly average 
number of families receiving family allowance increased from 1.37 million to 1.50 million in the same period of 
time (CSO 2007). 
18
 The austerity measures were worked out in full discretion without the involvement of the parliamentary parties 
or social partners. This was the only time from 1968 onwards when stabilisation was initiated without any 
compromise.  
ambitious reform measures proved to be doubtful. It restored competitiveness of the economy 
by reducing real wages in the economy by 12 per cent and by speeding up privatisation, but 
the structural reform of the general government came to a halt relatively soon. Admittedly, it 
tried to do so, but most of the reforms were classified as unconstitutional by the Constitutional 
Court or were suspended by the time of the upcoming elections in 1998, which saw electoral 
economics reborn.
19
 
By 1999, the growth rate of private consumption exceeded once again the increase of 
overall economic activity, which was further deepened by the world-wide economic 
slowdown in 2001 and the fierce competition at the next parliamentary elections of 2002 
(Figure 2.). Election economics along with the old reflexes of compensating losers of the 
austerity package have re-emerged.
20
 The consequent deterioration of fiscal balance put 
Hungary again on an unsustainable path of development. Apart from a short period of fiscal 
discipline, Hungary has returned to consumption-maximisation, characterised by an 
expansionist state paternalism, financed by increased public liabilities. It also referred to the 
unwillingness of politicians to embark on the radical and necessary policy changes, especially 
in the field of public finances.
21
 
 
Figure 2. Change in economic output and private consumption, 1995-2008 
 
Source: data are taken from the EC (2006 and 2008). 
Note: red line: 3 per cent reference value of Maastricht. 
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 A 0.5 per cent sufficit in the primary balance in 1997 was changed to a deficit (2.2 per cent) in 1998 (OECD 
2000). With the approach of elections, pension payments were increased by 22 per cent (in nominal terms), 
while public sector salaries experienced an increase of 13 to 16 per cent. The health care sector also benefited 
from election-year economics. The increase of extra spending did not stop after the 1998 elections. The 
incoming conservative government generously bailed out two banks, and also the State Privatisation and Holding 
Corporation received a substantial subsidy. One-off measures increased the deficit well above the planned targets 
(EIU 1999:26). 
20
 In 2002, the governing socialist-liberal coalition announced explicitly the initiation of a “systemic change in 
welfare politics” which meant a radical shift away from fiscal discipline to increased welfare spending in order 
to redistribute the fruits of the stabilisation measures of 1995-1997 to as many people as possible.  
21
 See for instance Antal, Csillag and Mihályi (2005). 
The two main sources of fiscal overruns by 2001-2004 were the increased public 
sector wages (along with the statutory minimum wage hike
22
) and the increased household 
transfers. On average, employees in the public sector received a fifty per cent hike in total 
between 2001 and 2003. The share of compensation of public sector employees to total 
outlays climbed to 25 per cent by 2003 from the initial 20 per cent in 2000 (OECD 2004). A 
far as household transfers are concerned, family-related benefits proliferated substantially 
both in scope and size (i.e., family allowance, maternity allowance, child-bearing benefit and 
childcare benefit, child raising support and childcare allowance). Generous housing subsidies 
can also be considered as welfare provisions.
23
 For pensioners, the so-called 13th month 
premium was introduced by 2002 in a country where 90 per cent of the employees have been 
eligible to retire years earlier than the official retirement age. 
Hungary has also been the country with the highest share of disability benefit 
recipients, and the amount of social benefit paid to this group has increased drastically over 
the past decade. The number of disability benefit recipients increased from the starting level 
of 250,000 in the early nineties to 450,000 in 2004 which is more than 11 per cent of the 
employees.
24
 Sick pay on the other hand has been used by many as an extension of 
unemployment benefit after the termination of the employment contract. In the mid-2000s, 
unemployment insurance benefit was paid to around 100-130,000 people, supplemented by an 
incredibly high number of 80,000 people receiving sick pay. The generous welfare system, 
along with an outstandingly high tax wedge on employment, provides serious disincentives to 
work: only (a bit less than) four million out of the total seven million active people are 
registered employees in Hungary. Furthermore, welfare benefits are considered to be 
entitlements. Once people have become entitled to receive them, they show strong political 
resistance to any change in the system.
25
 
The post-2000 years have been heavily burdened with fiscal profligacy, irrespective of 
the political makeup of the governing coalition. Hungary – due to the lack of action and ill-
conceived policy choices – has found itself in the crossfire of swelling criticism: international 
rating agencies have downgraded the country, and even Brussels has blamed Hungary several 
times, thereby making the loss of credibility of the Hungarian economic policy (and policy 
makers) fully overt. The period between 2001 and 2006 can be best characterised as a 
permanent election campaign where both the incumbents and the opposition tried to 
outperform their rivals by promising more spending from the budget without keeping an eye 
on the financing constraint of their populist measures. Albeit from autumn 2006 the 
government initiated some changes and fiscal discipline has been strengthened somewhat, 
essential reform measures are still waiting to be adopted. As Csaba (2009:95) accurately 
stated: “the stagnation of reforms and the deepening of mutual distrust among and across all 
players of the political scene have created a paralysis.”  
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 Kertesi and Köllő (2004) found that the wage rise triggered a significant fall in employment opportunities, 
especially in the small- and medium-sized sector. They estimated a 3.5 per cent decrease of employment in 
companies employing 5-20 persons. The most seriously hit sectors were the labour-intensive ones. 
23
 Between 2001 and 2004 mortgage lending was actively supported by the housing subsidy schemes of 
alternating governments, providing a negative real interest rate for borrowers (i.e. families). Furthermore, the 
monthly mortgage payment was tax-deductible. 
24
 An additional 350,000 people receive disability benefit, although they have already passed the retirement age. 
In total, 9 per cent of the population within the 20 to 64 age group is entitled to a disability benefit in Hungary, 
which is in strong contrast with that of other CEE countries or the neighbouring Austria for instance, where the 
ratio is around 6 per cent only (OECD 2004:76). 
25
 A more elaborated scrutiny of the expenditure side of the Hungarian general budget between 1995 and 2006 is 
provided by Benczes (2008). 
5. Conclusion 
Hungary is one of the worst-hit countries of the current financial crisis in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The deteriorating economic performance of the country is, however, not a recent 
phenomenon, as the paper has documented this. A high ratio of redistribution, a high and 
persistent deficit and accelerated indebtedness are not new phenomena in Hungary, but 
elements of both the communist and the postcommunist history of the country.  
By providing a path-dependent explanation, the paper argued that starting with the 
marketisation attempts in the socialist era, that is, well before the systemic change of 1989-90 
itself, politicians used the general budget as a buffer to compensate losers of economic and 
political reforms. This attitude did not change with alternating governments after the first free 
elections either, and it has been re-emerging from time to time in the last twenty years.  
In fact, individual-specific uncertainty and the heavy burden of structural reform of the 
(micro) economy have been compensated by increased public provisions in the form of 
increased transfers. It seems that the success of marketisation and microeconomic 
restructuring, which once made Hungary the most advanced transition economy in the region, 
came at the price of a deteriorated fiscal discipline. Political forces managed to harden the 
budget constraint of enterprises on the one hand and to maintain a relatively large supportive 
winning coalition of restructuring on the other hand, only at the cost of softening the budget 
constraint of the state. In turn, paternalism has survived the systemic change and sadly it now 
endangers the healthy and sustainable development of the country – a country which had a 
remarkable reform history but which has dramatically devaluated its future prospects. 
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